South Sudan in Crisis

South Sudan has a history of mass atrocities, and despite a peace agreement in 2018 ending a brutal civil war, structural risk factors for atrocities remain. The return to fighting in January 2025 between the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the SPLM In Opposition (SPLM-IO) and a political breakdown at the highest levels of government have created a very dangerous situation where parties may have the renewed motivation to escalate attacks on civilians on the basis of identity. This piece outlines the recent crisis, what policy makers should monitor, and what can be done to mitigate the harm to civilians.

Background 

South Sudan became independent in 2011. Two years later, President Salva Kiir, leader of the SPLM and with predominantly Dinka fighters, went to war with Vice President Riek Machar, leader of the SPLM-IO with largely Nuer forces. Both sides used ethnicity as a tool of recruitment and collective punishment, and in 2016, the United Nations (UN) warned that ethnic cleansing was taking place. The 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement ended the war at the national level, but sporadic fighting persisted at the community level. The transitional government has not implemented most of the terms agreed to in 2018, including elections, a unified army, and transitional justice. 

Current Crisis

The current crisis in South Sudan has disturbing echoes of the 2013 civil war. In January, the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), the armed forces of the SPLM, and the SPLM-IO clashed in the states of Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal. In February, President Kiir replaced officials from the SPLM-IO with his close allies in the SPLM.

In Nasir County, Upper Nile state, traditionally an SPLM-IO stronghold, President Kiir deployed SSPDF forces that included ethnic militias, which Vice President Machar argued violated the terms of the Peace Agreement. On February 14, in Nasir County, the SSPDF started fighting with armed youth believed to be members of the White Army, an armed group from the Nuer community and a longtime ally of the SPLM-IO. The SSPDF accused the SPLM-IO of inciting violence and, on February 25th, launched airstrikes on SPLM-IO positions. The situation quickly escalated, with the White Army seizing former SSPDF barracks and then attacking a UN helicopter that was attempting to evacuate an SSPDF General. Kiir requested support from Uganda, leading to the deployment of the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). The UN has confirmed that communities "are being subjected to persistent aerial bombardment using devices, barrel bombs, allegedly containing a highly flammable liquid that acts as an accelerant on explosion." Locals have accused both the SSPDF and the UDPF of aerial attacks.

The government quickly moved to detain SPLM-IO military and civilian officials. On March 28, the government arrested Vice President Machar on charges of instigating a rebellion. Machar has denied links with the White Army, and his party warned that his arrest voids the 2018 Peace Agreement. This has triggered diplomatic outreach from the UN, the African Union (AU), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 

Escalating Mass Atrocity Risk

There are multiple factors present in South Sudan that increase the risk of a recurrence of mass atrocities. These include a history of identity-based discrimination and atrocities committed with impunity, unrelenting instability and armed conflict at the state and community level, and the presence of hate speech and exclusionary ideology. The UN has raised concerns that "rampant misinformation, disinformation and hate speech is also ratcheting up tensions and driving ethnic divisions, and fear." Much of the pain and grievance from the civil war have remained unaddressed, and political elites have chosen to exploit, rather than resolve, intercommunal and interethnic tensions. Abrupt cuts in humanitarian aid have been made in a context where nearly half the population requires assistance. The situation today is ripe for a return to large-scale systematic attacks on civilians on the basis of their identity. 

What to Watch

Escalation in historically opposition-controlled areas. If the White Army marches on the multiethnic state capital of Malakal, which is home to both Dinka and Nuer civilians, this could result in devastating intercommunal violence and escalate the conflict beyond the Upper Nile. The White Army has a history of targeting civilians. If the SSPDF (with UPDF support) increases air strikes and tries to eliminate the White Army, this will likely result in attacks on Nuer civilians. In now-deleted posts on X, Uganda's military chief Muhoozi Kainerugaba (and son of Uganda’s President) posted: "I'm tired of killing Nuer" and that the UPDF will destroy the Nuer if they do not surrender. Increased fighting between SPLM-IO and SPLM forces in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal could also result in attacks on civilians on the basis of ethnicity. 

The collapse of the 2018 Peace Agreement, President Kiir is arguably taking advantage of the crisis in Upper Nile to irrevocably weaken Vice President Machar and the SPLM-IO, which could result in the collapse of the Peace Agreement or the maintenance of the Agreement in name only. The collapse of the Agreement could result in civil war, which carries the risk of a return to ethnic cleansing. An Agreement that survives in name only, with strong unilateral control by the SPLM, could leave few incentives for the government to genuinely implement measures, such as transitional justice and democratization, that could help address the root causes of the current crisis, or to change its treatment of civilians based on ethnicity or political affiliation. 

Fragmentation. While the SPLM-IO appears weaker today than in 2013, the fragmentation in armed groups in South Sudan raises the possibility that any number of these groups could perceive the collapse of the agreement as a green light to fight for priorities at the state level that may not be easily addressed by diplomatic engagement in the capital. Within the SPLM, conflicting views about who should succeed President Kiir could lead to fragmentation and violence. 

Policy Options for Atrocity Prevention

Prioritize civilian protection and humanitarian aid for Upper Nile. The UN, AU, and IGAD should consider the dispatch of a neutral force to Upper Nile state capable of protecting civilians from both non-state and state actors. The UN Security Council should consider the mandate and capacity of the UN Mission for South Sudan (UNMISS) to fulfill this role and investigate the possible violation of the UN Security Council Arms Embargo on South Sudan by Uganda. Multilateral bodies should also investigate the possible use of incendiary weapons and ensure the flow of humanitarian aid into affected areas.

Increase diplomatic pressure. The United States, United Kingdom, and Norway (the Troika) and other supporters of the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement should consider putting intense diplomatic pressure on President Kiir and other key actors (including Uganda) to pursue a negotiated peace in Upper Nile, secure the release of Vice President Machar and due process for detained SPLM-IO officials, and ensure comprehensive, transparent, inclusive, and time-bound implementation of Peace Agreement obligations. Placating Kiir in the interest of stabilizing the country in the short term will not automatically guarantee civilian protection, given the SPLM’s history of targeting civilians. These governments should also push for civil society representatives to have access to diplomatic missions visiting South Sudan during the crisis. 

Support civil society. Donor countries and multilateral bodies should continue to invest in civil society participation in the political transition and transitional justice process. Donors can offer funding for local efforts on social cohesion and combating hate speech and disinformation.

Danica Damplo is the Policy Manager for the Simon-Skjodt Center.