Crackdowns and a Disputed Election Elevate Mass Atrocity Concerns for Chad

Since the April 2021 death of its president of 30 years, Idriss Déby, Chad has faced widespread instability marked by broken transition promises, protests, and attacks on people affiliated with opposition groups.

For several years, Chad has placed in the top 30 of the Early Warning Project’s Statistical Risk Assessment for the risk of experiencing a new mass killing. In March 2023, the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide warned of increasing risk of mass atrocities—referring to large-scale, systematic violence against civilian populations—in Chad. More than a year on, shifting political dynamics, conflicts affecting multiple regions, and a disputed presidential election signal further increased risk.

Mass Atrocity Risk Factors 

Chad exhibits two conditions that research indicates are strong risk factors for mass atrocities: large-scale political instability and armed conflict. 

A tumultuous political transition

In May 2024, a disputed election ended Chad’s more than three-year transition period. Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, the transitional president and son of the former president, prevailed. International groups, including the European Union, Human Rights Watch, and the International Crisis Group, reported concerns surrounding the credibility of the return to civilian rule. Succès Masra, who Déby had appointed as prime minister just months prior, unsuccessfully challenged the election results and resigned from his post. Authorities reportedly arrested hundreds of protesters and 12 people were killed surrounding the vote. 

The election came amid the government's violent crackdown on opposition groups. In February, one day after the transitional authorities announced the presidential election would occur several months earlier than anticipated, security forces killed expected opposition presidential candidate Yaya Dillo. While details surrounding Dillo’s death remain contested, some opposition members labeled this killing an attempt to remove competition ahead of the elections. 

Multiple threats of armed conflict throughout the country

The war in neighboring Sudan compounds the internal political instability in Chad. The countries have historically had a tense relationship, marked by mutual accusations of supporting rebels in the other country.

The Chadian government includes members of the Zaghawa ethnic group—including Déby, who is half-Zaghawa. The Rapid Security Forces (RSF) and allied militias in Sudan have targeted non-Arab communities (including the Zaghawa, Masalit, and others). Déby has reportedly faced internal pressure to support Zaghawa armed resistance groups in Sudan. At the same time, Déby’s government faces allegations that it is allowing the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to use Chad as a base for channeling weapons to the RSF. Since some officials in Chad have opposed this, the allegations could cause rifts in the government and among Zaghawa groups in Sudan, who could challenge Chad’s government.

Approximately 600,000 refugees and returnees have entered Chad from Sudan since April 2023. In October 2023, Déby warned of resource-based conflicts between refugees and Chadian civilians amid an already dire humanitarian crisis.

Coupled with the crisis in neighboring Sudan, Chad faces ongoing armed threats in multiple regions, including confrontations at the northern border with Libya, banditry, and extremist violence in the Lake Chad Basin. The multiple conflicts may further destabilize the country and pose risks of increased violence against civilians. 

Key Developments to Monitor  

Considering the atrocity risk factors in Chad, policy makers should closely monitor events that could precipitate mass atrocities. Key uncertainties include the following: 

Will there be large-scale protests ahead of the legislative and local elections later this year? If so, how will the government respond?

Chadian authorities have historically engaged in a pattern of intimidation and harassment of opposition groups, particularly surrounding key events such as elections. Following the death of Yaya Dillo, reports indicate the authorities have renewed and intensified crackdowns on opposition party members, including alleged arrests and physical attacks. If the authorities perceive protests as a threat to their hold on power, they may respond with similar tactics used in October 2022. 

The authorities’ continued repression of political opposition and civil society actors might deter and limit the likelihood that civilians will organize or sustain mass demonstrations. For example, the May 2024 elections did not see significant protests across cities. Additionally, Déby has previously tried to co-opt opposition actors to tighten his control and may be conscious that systematic attacks against the opposition could threaten his control. 

Will ruling elites contest Déby’s control?

The response to the war in Sudan, the killing of Yaya Dillo, and the contested May election could indicate a greater likelihood for internal fragmentation among members of the government or the military who disagree with Déby’s course of action. This could lead members of the government or outside actors to seize on instability and attempt a coup. A coup could cause widespread disorder and lead authorities to target civilians—such as civilians affiliated with the opposition in the south—perceived as an obstacle to securing power.

However, Déby has stacked the transitional government and replaced members of the military with loyalists, which could limit internal fragmentation and the likelihood of a coup. In addition, while other actors, such as opposition politicians or rebel groups, could seek to contest Déby’s rule, this may be less likely given diminished rebel group activity and consistent crackdowns on civil society. 

Will community divisions expand?

Chad's political instability has the potential to exacerbate group grievances, especially between communities in the north and south. For decades, members of the Zaghawa, the Gorane, and Arab ethnic groups—whom communities in the south often perceive as elites from the north—have held a majority of government positions. Growing grievances among communities in the south who do not feel represented in the government could lead civilians to protest or organize an armed response to the government. The authorities could respond violently if they perceive communities in the south as significant threats to their hold on power, calling back to previous abuses against civilians in the region under Chad’s former ruler, Hissène Habré. Additionally, dynamics from the war in Sudan could spill over into Eastern Chad, leading to similar group targeting dynamics (i.e., Arab armed groups targeting non-Arab communities).

There are currently no indications communities in the south would attempt to directly challenge Déby’s government, particularly given the prior history of atrocities. Experts we spoke to noted that communities in the south do not currently have access to arms to facilitate such a resistance. In addition, while Déby has reportedly allowed UAE arms transfers to the RSF in Sudan, the authorities have portrayed their public response as focused on responding to the refugee crisis in the country’s east.

Preventive action needed

The international community’s muted response to violence against civilians and repression of opposition to date could lead the Chadian government to continue or escalate violent campaigns against opposition or civil society groups if the government perceives threats.

Pursuing policies to prevent mass atrocities presents an opportunity to protect civilians in Chad while supporting regional stability. The United States government, working with the support of like-minded countries, should conduct an atrocity risk assessment for regions across Chad and use this analysis to develop a coordinated plan for preventive action.